We examine the response of economic activity to variations in state corporate income tax policies. We develop a more inclusive model of the components of a state corporate income tax system than has been used in prior literature to more closely account for the complexity involved and to more accurately measure the partial effects of each component. We apply this model to state personal income, Gross State Product (GSP), and employment to assess the relative importance of each tax policy component to these different measures of economic activity. Results indicate that the state corporate income tax rate is only an important determinant of economic activity through its interactions with other policy variables, especially throwback rules (which return unapportioned income back to the home state). A heavy sales factor weighting within the apportionment formula is associated with lower levels of personal income and GSP, except in the case of a single sales factor policy, which is associated with higher levels of GSP. Throwback rules are associated with higher levels of personal income and GSP but, interestingly, lower levels of employment. Combined reporting has no effect on personal income or employment but is associated with higher levels of GSP. We also specify alternative models in which each state's economic activity is measured as a share of the national total in each year. We find evidence that tax rates, apportionment, and throwback rules represent a zero-sum game among the states. Conversely, a positive effect of combined reporting on GSP likely represents new business activity.
INTRODUCTION
State policy makers frequently use tax policy to spur economic activity and to compete with other states to attract new capital. Although researchers have examined the effectiveness of state and local tax policy as an economic stimulus, no consensus exists regarding whether and how state corporate income tax policies affect economies. This study examines whether variations in the most fundamental aspects of state corporate income tax regimes affect state economic activity. Prior studies have focused on discretionary incentives that are provided to specific firms (Bartik, 2005; Lynch and Fishgold, 1996) or have separately revealed the importance of certain specific statutory corporate income tax attributes (Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Carlton, 1983) .
We focus on statutory components of state corporate income taxes that apply broadly in most U.S. states and for most multi-state corporate taxpayers. In addition, we build a model that includes an array of state corporate income tax policy variables to more-closely simulate a true state corporate income tax regime and the relationships that exist between its various components. By controlling for these various components rather than testing each in isolation, we can more accurately assess the incremental contribution of each component to state economies. We also examine the interactions of each of these components with the highest statutory state corporate income tax rate because the economic impacts of any particular corporate income tax policy likely depend on the state's corporate income tax rate. Also, few studies have investigated multiple measures of economic activity. We separately analyze three different measures of economic activity in order to provide a more complete picture of the impacts of corporate tax systems.
We contribute to the prior literature in several ways. First, we develop a model that controls not only for corporate income tax rates, but also for such key provisions as apportionment formulas, throwback rules, and combined reporting rules. Second, we investigate the degree to which the effects of specific attributes within state corporate income tax regimes are dependent on each other. Tax rates do not influence decisions in isolation, but rather in the presence of a host of other statutory tax attributes. Therefore, we include interactions between the state corporate income tax rate and each of the other tax policy variables to assess the dependencies among them. Prior research has mostly focused on the question of whether some aggregate measure of tax burden, or some particular tax characteristic affects economic activity, but few have addressed the question of which components are most important, 1 which is of particular interest to policy makers.
Third, we further integrate prior findings by analyzing three different economic indicators in order to inform policy makers as to which economic benefits or detriments will accrue as a result of a variety of corporate income tax policy decisions. Our economic measures include personal income, Gross State Product (GSP), and non-farm employment. Although our models are estimated separately, comparisons can be made in terms of which economic areas are responsive to variations in each of the tax policy components.
Our econometric strategy consists of a series of panel regressions using state-level panel data for 1996 through 2007. Results indicate that the state corporate income tax rate is an important determinant of economic activity, but it operates primarily through its interactions with other policy variables, especially throwback rules. A heavy sales factor weighting within the apportionment formula is associated with lower levels of personal income and GSP, except in the case of a single sales factor, which is associated with higher levels of GSP. Throwback rules are associated with higher levels of personal income and GSP but lower levels of employment.
Combined reporting has no effect on personal income or employment but is associated with higher levels of GSP. We also estimate alternative models in which each state's economic activity is measured as a share of the national economic activity in each year. We find evidence that tax rates, apportionment formulas, and throwback rules represent a zero-sum game among the states, while combined reporting can increase GSP in a positive-sum sense.
Our study is particularly important for policy makers because decisions regarding corporate income tax rates, apportionment, combined reporting, and throwback rules are inevitable ones in the corporate income tax policy-making process. State legislators can make informed decisions about corporate income tax policies knowing which policies will be effective in spurring economic activity and which are dependent on other state tax policies, specifically the corporate income tax rate. Policy makers can use results from this study in conjunction with similar studies that investigate the impact of these policies on revenues in order to gain a clearer picture of the tradeoffs between revenue and economic activity that will occur in the design of a state corporate income tax.
STATE CORPORATE INCOME TAX POLICIES
It is clear that, all else equal, lower corporate income tax rates would be expected to increase economic activity because of the reduced cost of such activity to in-state firms as well as the potential to attract new activity from out-of-state firms. However, there is much more to the story than corporate income tax rates. For example, most states require multi-state firms to allocate income based on the firm's in-state percentage of its total sales, payroll, and property.
Many states weight these three factors equally, in which case a firm's taxable in-state income is determined by calculating the firm's in-state portion of each of these factors, and then taking the average of the three resulting percentages. The use of these factors to apportion income transforms the state corporate income tax into three separate taxes on each of the factors (McClure, 1980) .
Because the sales factor typically includes the amount of sales made at the destination of the sale, whereas property and payroll are sitused at their origin, the sales factor benefits in-state, capital-intensive firms by exporting the tax to those firms that have significant in-state sales and little or no in-state capital and payroll. Perhaps due to state competition to attract new capital (Fox and Luna, 2002) , many states have altered the traditional equally-weighted three factor formula to place more weighting on the sales factor. Some states have even gone as far as a 100-percent sales factor, essentially converting the state corporate income tax into a tax on gross receipts.
By increasing the weight on sales, states reduce the tax burden borne by the payroll and property factors. Thus, states may choose to increase the burden on sales to reduce labor and property costs for in-state firms, encourage generation of new jobs and spending, and to attract new capital investment. However, by increasing the weight on sales, states may also be discouraging firms from making sales in-state, which might negatively influence economic growth. This possibility has been confirmed empirically by Edmiston and Arze del Granado (2006) , who found that in-state reported sales are decreasing in the weight given to the sales factor. Also, Klassen and Shackelford (1998) found that in-state manufacturing shipments are decreasing in the income tax rate applied to the sales factor weighting, although the result only occurs in states with throwback rules (see below). At the same time, firms may increase the use of productive factors due to the decrease in tax burden on capital and payroll that arises from increasing the sales factor weight, which would spur economic activity (Edmiston and Arze del Granado, 2006) . Therefore, the expected relation between economic growth and the weight given to the sales factor is ambiguous.
Throwback rules alter the sales factor as well. A state that has a throwback rule includes in the numerator of a company's sales factor not only in-state sales, but also any sales that occur but are not taxed in other states. The rule essentially disallows "nowhere sales." Clearly this rule
is not beneficial to multi-state corporations that are required to pay tax in such a state because it increases costs and reduces opportunities for tax planning. Multi-state companies may avoid throwback states or limit their activity in throwback states to include only sales. Typically, if a company's only activity in a state is sales, the company is not subject to the state's corporate income tax and thus not subject to the apportionment and throwback rules. 2 Firms that are subject to the tax in a throwback state and find it too costly to re-locate may respond by reducing in-state sales (Klassen and Shackelford, 1998) and "nowhere" sales. They might also resign to the throwback rule by reducing efforts to locate sales out-of-state. As with apportionment formulas, we expect throwback rules to have ambiguous effects on economic activity. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Choice of Economic Indicators. Wasylenko (1997, p.39) lists the most common measures of economic development as "income, employment, investment, plant expansions, relocations, and births." Previous studies have examined the impact of taxes on a variety of 4 Even in the presence of combined reporting, firms can still use transfer pricing with entities that are affiliated but not required to be part of the combined reporting group, such as foreign entities which some states do not require to be included (Fox et al., 2009; Commerce Clearing House, 2007) . 5 Of the states that do not require combined reporting, many of them allow it. We assume that combined reporting is a detriment to a company even though it can be beneficial for companies that have affiliates in loss positions that can be offset by other income-producing affiliates. However, for most income-producing companies, separate reporting is generally believed to be the preferred choice for firms. Therefore any state-year where combined reporting is only voluntary is coded as a non-combined-reporting state-year.
economic outcomes including but not limited to manufacturing employment or employment growth (Plaut and Pluta, 1983; Newman, 1983; Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985; Edmiston, 2002; Romans and Subrahmanyam, 1979) , new firm locations and entries (Fox and Murray, 1990; Bartik, 1985; Carlton, 1983; Papke, 1991) , new capital expenditures (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Papke, 1987) , changes in personal income (Romans and Subrahmanyam, 1979; Helms, 1985) , and changes in production output (Edmiston, 2002; Bruce, Deskins, and Fox, 2007 Bartik (1992 and 1994) summarized 48 studies of the effect of state and local taxes on economic growth and argued that the evidence supports a negative relationship. He concluded that state and local taxes have important effects on economic development although the use of state and local tax policy to attract economic development may be more costly than it is beneficial. Phillips and Goss (1995) performed a meta-analysis of the same 48 studies and found a larger effect of total taxes on economic growth than Bartik (1994) had found. Later, Wasylenko (1997) reviewed the literature and concluded that taxes have a statistically significant effect on interregional behavior, but the effect is not substantial in economic terms. 6 We follow Bruce, Deskins, and Fox (2007) in using non-governmental GSP because governmental output may not be subject to the corporate income tax. 7 This discussion includes prior literature related to business locations because of the assumption that new business locations and investment should lead to economic growth. In this literature, states use tax policy to compete for new business with the objective of spurring in-state economic activity.
We know of no studies that survey the literature strictly related to the economic effects of state corporate income taxes. Additionally, the relatively large body of heterogeneous literature that each of the aforementioned surveys investigated included studies that found economically important effects but also studies that found either no statistical significance, or economically negligible effects. The result is that the true importance of state and local taxes, and specifically state corporate income taxes, to economic activity is still in question.
Prior research has examined each of the features of a state corporate income tax addressed in our study; however, the heterogeneous mix of models developed and the often conflicting results imply there is still no consensus regarding the effects of these policies. Bruce, Deskins, and Fox (2007) found that the top statutory corporate income tax rate, a throwback rule, and combined reporting were all insignificant as predictors of state GSP. Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) found that the income tax rate is not a significant determinant of states' manufacturing employment, but the payroll factor weighting in the apportionment formula is an influential factor to employment. However, according to studies by Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Anand and Sansing (2000) , variation in both apportionment formulas and tax rates should, at least in theory, affect location decisions for jobs and property, which should result in economic growth.
This analytical result has been corroborated empirically by Edmiston and Arze del Granado (2006), who used firm level data to show that after Georgia moved from an equally weighted apportionment formula to a double-weighting on the sales factor, multi-state corporations increased significantly the use of productive factors in Georgia. Also, Klassen and Shackelford (1998) found that the sales a company reports to a state were decreasing in the marginal corporate income tax rate applied to the sales factor, but only in throwback states.
A few studies directly address the relative importance of these features of a state corporate income tax, or a smaller subset of them. There is some evidence that corporate income tax rates are better determinants of economic growth than other state income tax features. For example, Lightner (1999) found that low income tax rates, rather than apportionment formulas, led to employment growth. Her study also showed that neither a heavily weighted sales factor nor a throwback rule was important in attracting economic development to a state. Fox et al., (2009) also found the income tax rate to be a determinant of state GSP while other features like combined reporting and apportionment had no impact.
Contrary to these results, Williams, Swenson, and Lease (2001) found that combined reporting was more important to firm choices than the income tax rate. They used simulations to
show that tax rate changes can have significant effects on the allocation of property and labor for states that require combined reporting, but only small effects for those that do not. Gupta and Hofmann (2003) directly addressed the relative importance of the income tax rate, combined reporting, and throwback rules. They found that the income tax burden on property (i.e. the corporate income tax rate times the apportionment property factor weight) had a statistically significant negative effect on new capital expenditures in the manufacturing sector.
They also split their sample into throwback and non-throwback states to analyze the effects of the property income tax burden on new capital expenditures. Although they found significance for apportionment and the property burden, they argued that the existence of a throwback rule and combined reporting requirements may offset any benefits to firms from low tax rates and favorable apportionment. These results highlight the need for an examination of the effects of the interactions of these policies on economic activity.
MODEL AND DATA
Our empirical approach is to estimate variations on the following panel regression equations using a panel of hand-collected state-level data for 1996 through 2007. Each of the k tax policy variables are also interacted with the corporate income tax rate.
represents other control variables expected to affect state economic activity (also with a one-year lag), and ρ i and θ t represent state and year fixed effects, respectively. We employ one-year lags of all independent variables in order to account for the time needed for firm responses to tax policy decisions to be reflected in economic indicators. The use of lagged variables also mitigates the issues that arise due to differences in data reporting between fiscal years and calendar years (Fox et al., 2009) as well as potential issues with endogeneity. We use a natural log transformation for all dependent variables to control for scaling effects (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Bruce, Deskins, and Fox, 2007; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003) .
8 Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming do not have a corporate income tax but are included in the analysis because the lack of a corporate income tax should have implications for economic activity. Michigan employs a Single Business Tax which is more like a Value Added Tax than an income tax. Texas's business tax during the period is also quite different from a true income tax because firms must pay the higher of a franchise tax or a tax on earned surplus. Nevertheless, these two states are included because these two business taxes should also affect business decisions. We explore the implications of including these states in sensitivity analyses presented later. 9 Some states allow firms to deduct federal income taxes. For these states, the highest marginal corporate income tax rate has been adjusted to account for this deduction.
Definitions and source notes for all variables are provided in Fox et al. (2009) found that the allowance of LLCs tempers the reaction of state GSP to changes in the state corporate 10 Several alternative specifications for the apportionment variables were considered, including recategorizing stateyears where the sales weighting was greater than 80 percent to the 100 percent category; using a continuous variable that contained the percentage weighting on the sales factor; and basing the categories on default values given by CCH for all firms, rather than the more favorable optional choices available to manufacturing firms as used in our main analyses. In all three of these alternative approaches, inferences on test variables remained unchanged except in a few cases where the apportionment variables became statistically insignificant. Complete results are available upon request.
11 While a few states impose an entity-level income tax on LLCs, controlling for such a tax is problematic because a majority of the states impose some type of fee or franchise tax on LLCs. A tax rate variable could not be used since the bases for these fees vary dramatically across states and since many of the fees are flat fee amounts rather than rates. A binary control for whether a state imposes a tax/fee on LLCs was also considered; however this type of control does not adequately capture differences in tax burden since some states actually impose a true income tax while others impose only a minimal fee for doing business.
income tax rate, and so we include the interaction of the state corporate income tax rate with the allowance of LLCs in our three models. Because firms face a system of various types of taxes when making decisions (Phillips, Cline, and Neubig, 2008) , we control for the highest marginal personal income tax rate, the sales tax rate, and the income tax burden on property. Although a corporation is not directly subject to the personal income tax, certainly its managers, employees, directors, and corporate shareholders are. Corporations are subject to the sales tax directly in their business-to-business transactions and also indirectly through the changes in relative prices caused by these taxes. The income tax burden on property is proxied by the state's total state and local property tax revenues divided by total state and local tax revenue from all sources.
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We include the percentage of a state's workers who are union members (Lightner, 1999; Bartik, 1985) and the average hourly manufacturing wage to control for labor costs (Lightner, 1999) . Energy prices,captured by the Department of Energy's report of the price per million Btu of total energy, are included to account for other input costs (Bruce, Deskins, and Fox, 2007; Wasylenko, 1997; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Lightner, 1999; Carlton, 1983; Bartik, 1985) . We include both population (in thousands) and median household income 13 to control for differences in market size and demand across the 50 states (Bruce, Deskins, and Fox, 2007; Wasylenko, 1997) . Because state and local spending may affect the level of economic activity (Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985) , we include per capita government expenditures less welfare and transfer payments (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Bruce, Deskins, and Fox, 2007) . 14 Lastly, a better educated workforce might provide an incentive for firms to establish businesses in-state and 12 The state and local Census information necessary to calculate the income tax burden on property is not available for 2001 or 2003. For these years, the data were interpolatedusing the years before and after each missing year. 13 Median income is excluded from the personal income model. 14 We subtract welfare expenditures following Gupta and Hofmann (2003) . We use a per capita specification following Bruce, Deskins, and Fox (2007) .
might affect economic activity, so we control for the percentage of the population with at least a Bachelor's degree.
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 for the first and last years of our data. The mean top marginal corporate income tax rate decreased from 6.67 percent in 1995 to 6.55 percent in 2006. Although both increases and decreases occurred during the period, the small change reflected here is interesting in light of the widespread concerns about reductions in state corporate income tax revenue due to competition among states (Fox and Luna, 2002; Cornia et al., 2005) . That is not to say that competition does not exist, but that states compete using other types of incentives rather than the tax rate. 15 The percentage of states with throwback rules decreased slightly in the period from 52 percent in 1995 to 48 percent in 2006. However, the percentage of states with combined reporting requirements increased from 32 to 34 percent during the period. 16 Based on the trends in the apportionment formulas shown in Table 2 , it is clear that states increased the weight on the sales factor during the period, perhaps due to competition for new business or to alleviate the tax burden on payroll and property. Table 3 contains regression results for all three of our baseline models. Given the volume of results in Table 3 , we discuss our findings by tax policy variable rather than going through each model in isolation. We begin with a discussion of results for the top corporate income tax rate and then move to apportionment, throwback rules, and combined reporting before discussing other control variables.
RESULTS
15 States also compete using other types of taxes, discretionary and targeted incentives, and other provisions within corporate income tax regimes such as deductions and credits. 16 Although little variation exists in combined reporting requirements during our sample period, at least five states have adopted combined reporting effective for years after 2006 (Fox et al., 2009) .
State Corporate Income Tax Rates. Although the base effect of the corporate income tax rate is not statistically significant in any of the three models, the tax rate influences each measure of economic activity through its interactions with other tax variables. First, we find that the top corporate tax rate has a negative effect on personal income and non-farm employment in states with throwback rules. Second, the top rate has a negative effect on GSP in combined reporting states. We also observe a negative effect of the top tax rate on personal income and GSP when the sales factor weight in the apportionment formula is between 60 and 90 percent, and on GSP when the sales factor weight is 100 percent. Finally, the only instance in which we find that the top rate has a positive impact on economic activity is through its interaction with our LLC variable in the personal income model. In other words, a higher top corporate income tax rate typically reduces economic activity except that personal income tends to rise in states that allow LLCs.
Of course, it is important to consider the net impact of top tax rate changes on economic activity in typical states. Looking across the various statistically significant interactions, we can determine that the net effect of an increase in the top corporate income tax rate on personal income would be positive in LLC states regardless of the other policies in effect, negative in non-LLC states with either a throwback rule or a sales factor weight between 60 and 90 percent, and closer to zero in non-LLC states that either do not have a throwback rule or have a sales factor weight below 60 percent or above 90 percent. The net effect of an increase in the top corporate income tax rate on GSP is negative in combined reporting states or in states where the sales factor weight is above 60 percent, and zero otherwise. Finally, the net effect of an increase in the top corporate income tax rate on non-farm employment is negative in throwback states and zero otherwise.
Apportionment. Our first major finding regarding state corporate income tax apportionment formulas is that the sales factor weight has no discernible effect on employment. This is at least mildly surprising because a heavier sales factor weight would imply a lower payroll burden and thus more of an incentive to add jobs. We also find that states where the sales factor is between 60 and 90 percent have lower personal income and GSP relative to states with equally-weighted three-factor apportionment, and that those effects are larger the higher the top corporate income tax rate. For the average corporate income tax rate of 6.6 percent, heavily weighting the sales factor between 60 and 90 percent leads to a 10.6 percent reduction in personal income and a 12.5 percent reduction in GSP. One possible interpretation is that firms reduce in-state sales in the presence of a heavier tax burden on those sales. For such an interpretation to be plausible, it must be the case that these reductions in in-state sales outweigh any increase in economic activity that might come from new businesses that are attracted to the state due to its low relative burdens on capital and payroll.
Interestingly, the effects of a single-sales-factor policy (100 percent weight) are a bit different. Specifically, a single sales factor has a positive impact on GSP, but that effect falls as the top corporate rate rises. At the average top corporate tax rate of 6.6 percent, the single sales factor policy is associated with a GSP increase of 1.2 percent relative to states with equallyweighted three-factor apportionment. The net effect is positive for top tax rates up to about 7 percent, and increasingly negative for higher top tax rates. This result likely points to capital mobility: firms reallocate capital and resources to states with single sales factor policies, and these new businesses increase the economic activity of the state. Our results suggest that firms are unwilling to make these reallocations until the incentive-in the form of a single-sales-factor system-is strong enough to justify them. Further, these incentives turn negative at progressively high top corporate tax rates.
Throwback Rules. While all three of our models in Table 3 Perhaps firms increase the use of productive factors in the presence of an increased relative income tax burden on the sales factor that comes from a throwback rule, at least as long as the top corporate tax rate remains relatively low. It is reasonable to expect personal income, GSP, and employment to rise as a result. At the same time, it is also reasonable to expect these effects to diminish and turn negative as the top corporate tax rate rises. High-tax-rate states might drive economic activity outside of their borders if they enact a throwback rule.
Combined Reporting. Perhaps echoing the recent work of Fox et al. (2009) which finds little to no effect of combined reporting rules on revenues, our results indicate that combined reporting has no effect on either personal income or employment. However, we do find that combined reporting is associated with higher GSP. Moreover, that effect diminishes as the top corporate tax rate rises, and turns negative at the very highest top tax rates (i.e., those exceeding about 8.5 percent). This result is especially interesting given that firms often oppose combined reporting requirements due to the perceived detriments in terms of combining income and reducing tax planning opportunities. We would expect such a requirement to deter firm activity that leads to economic growth. However, perhaps firms that would otherwise engage in significant tax planning activities to avoid creating nexus in a state (which would include avoiding or limiting business conducted within the state) refrain from such tax planning in the presence of combined reporting because the firm's activities will be taxable due to an affiliation with an entity that already has nexus in the state.
Other Results. Perhaps because nearly all states allowed LLCs throughout our panel, we only find a statistically significant effect of our LLC variable on personal income. The relatively large base effect is mitigated by the top corporate tax rate interaction effect, but the combined effect remains negative for most state-year observations in our data. 17 We find that the personal income tax rate has a negative impact on GSP and employment and the income tax burden on property negatively affects personal income and GSP. Interestingly, a higher manufacturing wage is associated with lower levels of employment and lower GSP, as employers respond to higher market wages by reducing employment and/or production. The effects of remaining controls are either statistically insignificant or quantitatively unimportant.
Overall, it is clear that state corporate income tax policies affect economic activity, although to differing degrees depending on the policy in question and the economic activity examined. State corporate income tax rates are only important when considered in conjunction with other state tax policy variables, especially throwback rules. A heavy sales factor weight within the apportionment formula is associated with lower levels of personal income and GSP, except in the case of a single sales factor policy, which is actually associated with higher levels of GSP. Throwback rules tend to be associated with higher levels of personal income and GSP but lower levels of employment. Combined reporting has no effect on personal income or employment but is associated with higher levels of GSP.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Firm Locations. Because much of the research in this area either investigates directly the tax policy effects on firm locations or implicitly assumes that firm locations lead to increases in economic activity, it is important to determine whether our baseline results are driven by new economic activity from incumbent state firms and start-up businesses or by firm relocations from other states. In other words, how much of the change in economic indicators reflects the mobility of capital across state borders in response to variation in tax policies? In addition to the previous research already discussed, several studies have directly addressed whether tax rates affect business location decisions (Carlton, 1983; Bartik, 1985) with mixed results. Chirinko and Wilson (2008) examined whether capital formation is a zero-sum game among the U.S. states.
They found a positive economic response to tax-induced reductions in the price of capital in the home state, and a negative economic response to similar reductions in the price of capital in competitive states. More importantly, when the home state increases capital costs through taxes in proportion to the increase in competitor states, the home state capital formation is not affected.
Thus, changes in home state economic activity are due to the mobility of resources across states in response to variations in these state capital tax policies.
To address this question, we adjust the main model to a shares specification that follows Bruce and Deskins (Forthcoming) where each state's share of national total economic activity for the year (i.e. personal income, GSP, or employment) is the dependent variable. Results are shown in Table 4 .
While some of the patterns of the base effects and interaction effects are different from those in our baseline models, the key result is that corporate tax policies have statistically and quantitatively important effects on the state shares of economic activity. This key result indicates that at least some of the effects on the levels of economic activity in our baseline models might be the result of states capturing or redirecting activity from other states. In general, the effects of the corporate income tax rate, apportionment, and throwback rules on employment share and especially personal income and GSP shares are economically important.
That said, it is difficult to assess whether the entire effect is a shifting of activity across borders or whether at least part of the levels effects might actually represent an overall increase in economic activity. We are more confident when it comes to combined reporting, however.
Specifically, given the absence of statistically significant effects of combined reporting in Table   4 , the significant effects in Table 3 almost certainly represent an overall increase in GSP without major shifts in activity across state lines.
Sample Selection Alternatives. Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming do not have a corporate income tax but are included in the main analyses because the lack of a corporate income tax should have implications for economic activity. Michigan employs a Single Business Tax which is more like a Value Added Tax than an income tax. Texas's business tax is also quite different from a true income tax. During our sample period Texas required firms to pay the higher of a tax on capital (or net assets) and a tax on earned surplus. The earned surplus component is similar to an income tax. 18 Nevertheless, these 2 states are included in the main analyses because these two business taxes should also affect business decisions, regardless of their classification.
18 Texas's current system includes a gross receipts tax which was not effective during our sample period.
To test whether results are sensitive to the treatment or inclusion of these states, we performed several sensitivity analyses. First, we excluded the four states without a state corporate income tax as well as Texas and Michigan. Then, we performed a separate analysis excluding only the four states without a state corporate income tax. Table 5 provides results from models that exclude all 6 of these states. Differences from our baseline results in Table 3 are slight but interesting. First, the top corporate tax rate has a statistically and economically important negative base effect on personal income, and that effect is not affected by the presence of a throwback rule. Second, the tax rate effect on GSP is no longer a function of the presence of a sales factor weight between 60 and 90 percent, although the mere incidence of that degree of a sales factor now has an important positive effect on personal income. Finally, our LLC variable is now found to have a negative impact on GSP. In the end, while the exclusion of states without traditional corporate income tax systems changes some of our findings, our basic stories are unchanged.
To further investigate the effects of these states, we performed the main analyses excluding only Nevada, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Results of that exercise, which have been omitted for brevity, are similar to those in the main analyses in Table 3 .
Consequently, we conclude that the major differences between our baseline results in Table 3 and our alternative results in Table 5 are driven at least partly by Michigan and Texas. 19 This finding is likely due to the fact that Texas and Michigan both have relatively high values for all three dependent variables and yet both have very low corporate income tax rates over the sample period.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrates the complexity in assessing the importance of individual features of a state corporate income tax. Most of the empirical literature to date has focused on only a small subset of the components of a state corporate income tax, or individual components in isolation. To more accurately assess the partial effects of certain policy decisions, this study builds on previous literature by encompassing several of the most important components of state corporate income tax systems into one model. Also, we examine the effects of these policies on three different measures of economic activity to provide a broader investigation into their effects on state economies.
The results across the three models are varied which demonstrates the importance of examining the impact of tax policies on multiple indicators of economic activity. The state corporate income tax rate is important only through its interactions with other policy variables, especially throwback rules. A heavy sales factor weighting within the apportionment formula is associated with lower levels of personal income and GSP, except in the case of a single sales factor policy, which is associated with higher levels of GSP. Throwback rules are associated with higher levels of personal income and GSP but lower levels of employment. Combined reporting has no effect on personal income or employment but is associated with higher levels of GSP.
Further analysis reveals that at least part of the measured effects of state corporate income tax rates, apportionment rules, and throwback rules represents a zero-sum game among the states where economic activity is simply shifted from one state to another. Combined reporting, on the other hand, is associated with an increased level of GSP but no change to the share of national GSP, indicating that responses to combined reporting might actually represent new business activity by firms. Other studies have addressed the impacts of these state corporate income tax policies on revenues (Gupta et al., 2009; Fox et al., 2009 ). The results of those studies can be used in conjunction with our results to aid policy makers in gaining a clearer understanding of the tradeoffs between revenue and economic activity that result from specific state corporate income tax policies.
Abstracting from corporate tax revenue effects (which often drive changes in state policy), our results reveal several potential avenues for state policies aimed at increasing economic activity. First, a reduction in the top corporate income tax rate could lead to higher personal income and non-farm employment in states with throwback rules, and to higher GSP in states with a combined reporting rule. A top corporate income tax rate cut could also lead to higher personal income in states with a sales factor weight between 60 and 90 percent and to higher GSP in states with a sales factor weight in excess of 60 percent. Interestingly, moving away from the traditional three-factor apportionment formula in isolation is not likely to have beneficial effects on economic activity. Indeed, a 60-to-90 percent sales factor weighting could lead to lower levels of personal income and GSP than might be observed under a traditional three-factor formula. A single-sales-factor apportionment formula could increase GSP, but the effect diminishes as the top corporate income tax rate rises. Throwback rules can be keys to higher personal income, GSP, and employment, especially when the top corporate income tax rate is low. Finally (and similarly), combined reporting can lead to higher GSP in lowercorporate-tax-rate states.
It will be important to revisit these issues as newer data become available. limitations, and measurement issues prevent us from specifying such a model in this paper.
Finally, future research should consider the extent to which states' economic activity levels are affected by neighboring states' tax policies, in addition to the variation in such policies. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.
All financial numbers have been indexed for inflation and all models include fixed effects for year and state.
All tests represent two-tailed tests. *,**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels.
All tests represent two-tailed tests. 
